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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to present and evaluate the theory and principles of economic 
policy applied before the 2008-2009 crisis
1. Against this backdrop we will attempt to 
describe  the  evolution  of  targets  and  tools  of  economic  policy  in  view  of  the 
experiences of recent years and the conditions of the globalization in this time. The 
first Section contains an outline of the world economic situation after 1945. Section 
two includes presentation and evaluation of the evolution of economic policy theory 
which co-created the conditions for world economic growth and stabilization in recent 
decades. The third Section describes macroeconomic mechanisms and conditions of  
economic policy directly preceding the 2007-2011 situation, and provides an analysis 
of the 2008-2009 crisis implications for the theory and future practice of economic 
policy. The paper is summed up in a conclusion.  
 
 
1. Economic Development After 1945  
 
1945-1971,  in  the  history  of  both  North  American  and  European  economies,  was 
among  the  most  prosperous  of  periods  [Table  1].  It  made  history  as  the  Golden  Age  of 
Capitalism [Marglin, Schor, 1990]. The world economy of that time was strongly influenced 
by American global leadership, politics and innovativeness. As a result of the then favorable 
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objective conditions of supply and demand (post-war reconstruction, progress in organization 
and technology, high supply of qualified labor force, etc.), and the stability of the Bretton 
Woods system, the American and European economies were growing at a fast and relatively 
stable rate (Table 1). The period was furthermore characterized by relatively low inflation. 
Countries  largely  financed  private  investments  and  public  sector  borrowing  requirements 
from domestic savings; there were relatively minor international capital flows
2.  
 
Table 1. Rate of growth and inflation in the USA and European Union countries 
                 in 1951-1970 
  1951-1960  1961-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990 
 USA 
Real GDP growth 
 average growth rate  3.4  4.2  3.3  3.2 
 standard deviation  2.9  2.0  2.5  2.2 
Inflation         
 average rate  2.1  2.8  7.9  2.6 
 standard deviation  2.3  1.7  3.1  0.5 
 European Union countries (EU 15) 
Real GDP growth 
 average growth rate  4.8  4.8  3.0  2.4 
 standard deviation  1.4  0.9  1.7  1.2 
Inflation         
 average rate  3.6  3.9  10.8  6.7 
 standard deviation  3.0  0.8  2.8  2.9 
Source: Eichengreen 2000, p. 30. 
 
This era symbolically ended first with the temporary suspension of the dollar’s peg to gold  
(August 1971) and then with the systemic departure of developed countries from the fixed 
exchange rate system (March 1973) [Eichengreen 2000, p. 30].  
The seventies and early eighties of the twentieth century were characterized by supply 
shocks and demand disruptions which completely changed the macro- and microeconomic 
environment of designing and implementing economic policy. The growth rate significantly 
decreased and its volatility increased (Table 1). Also, the level and volatility of inflation rose   4 
rapidly. High inflation was followed by growing unemployment. This situation gave rise to 
revaluation in the theory of economic policy and changes in the area of systemic solutions 
including both qualitative policy and quantitative policy
3 (see Section 2).  
The 1980s were characterized by diversified global economic conditions. In the case 
of the USA and Europe these included still low GDP growth rates but with a reduced inflation 
rate  (Table  1).  The  situation  was  particularly  difficult  in  Europe;  the  1980s  came  to  be 
referred to as the time of eurosclerosis [Olson 1996].  
The 1970-1990s in the global economy was distinguished by the growing importance 
of trade exposure (Graph 1). After 1970 the share of exports of goods and services in the  
































* Note: “Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to 
the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, 
license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, 
and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called 
factor services) and transfer payments”; WDI Data Base. 
Source: World Development Indicators Data Base. 
 
world Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with minor breaks, displayed an upward trend. This 
trend continued in 2000s (Graph 1). It was however, halted by the global recession; in 2006 
the export exposure reached the highest point of 33,9% of the global GDP and then fell by 6,5 
percentage points in 2009 – the highest drop in the post World War II era. The American 
economy was the fundamental source of global demand, but gradually the significance of 
other  countries  and  regions  increased,  including  the  European  Community,  particularly 
Germany, and further afield Japan in Asia.   
The 1990s and the early 2000s were characterized, especially in the USA, by a high 
and relatively stable growth rate
4. The first decade of the 21
st century featured the longest   5 
economic growth phase in history, lasting 120 months (Table 2).  Positive economic trends, 
especially in fighting inflation, occurred in Europe
5.  
 
Table 2. Business cycles and length of expansion and contraction phases (in months)  
in the USA after 1945 
Business cycle turning points  Length (in months) 
Peak  Bottom  Contraction phase  Expansion phase 
1945 (February)  1945 (October)  8  80 
1948 (November)  1949 (October)  11  37 
1953 (July)  1954 (May)  10  45 
1957 (August)  1958 (April)  8  39 
1960 (April)  1961 (February)  10  24 
1969 (December)  1970 (November)  11  106 
1973 (November)  1975 (March)  16  36 
1980 (January)  1980 (July)  6  58 
1981 (July)  1982 (November)  16  12 
1990 (July)  1991 (March)  8  92 
2001 (March)  2001 (November)  8  120 
2007 (December)  2009 (June)  18  73 
Source: Own compilation based on US business cycle expansions and contractions, NBER. 
 
Since the mid-1980s, the processes of economic globalization and regionalization have 
picked up pace. Countries successively followed the liberal reforms introduced in the United 
Kingdom.  An  important  role  in  promoting  the  liberal  model  of  economic  and  systemic 
solutions was played by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) [Kowalik 2002, p. 276 et 
seq., Findlay & O’Rourke 2004, p. 496 et seq.]. These parallel trends led to the rise in the  
importance of trade (Graph 1) and capital flows, and in the regional dimension – deepening of 
European integration and implementation of the decision on building a single and uniform 
European market [Hitiris 2003, pp. 63-83; Pelkmans 2006, pp. 79-99]. The direction and pace 
of European integration inspired and influenced the processes of regionalization in other parts 
of the world [Frenkel 1998; Gilpin 2000, p. 193 et seq.; Geyer 2006].  
Economic  globalization accelerated  even further  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  in 
1989,  taking  over,  with  all  economic,  social  and  political  implications,  the  countries  of   6 
Central and Eastern Europe. Literature on the subject refers to this period as the Second Great 
Age  of  Capitalism  [see  Gilpin  2000,  p.  15].  The  period  before  mid-2007  was  extremely 
advantageous  for  the  global  economy.  World  GDP  in  fact  grew  faster  than  the  world’s 
population. One of the major structural features of the economy was the increase in capital 
flows and global trade, significantly higher than the output growth. The development of trade, 
both worldwide and within regional integration groupings
6, allowed for a better allocation of 
resources and increase in production factors’ productivity. The expansion of trade relations 
was possible due to consecutive rounds of trade liberalization within the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), then the foundation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, 
and finally admission of the People’s Republic of China to this organization in 2001. China’s 
full-fledged entrance to the world trade has significantly modified ongoing macroeconomic 
processes
7.  This  major  structural  shift  was  accompanied  by  the  diminishing  capacity  of 
democratic national states to efficiently influence the direction and course of autonomous 
market adjustments. Permanent trade surplus and influx of direct foreign investments led to 
the accumulation of huge foreign reserves in China; the country became one of the main 
purchasers of American T-bills, T-bonds and other financial assets, thus largely contributing 
to the increase of overliquidity on the American financial markets
8.  
  Among the most important macroeconomic factors co-creating these processes was the 
increase of overliquidity in the years directly preceding the recession, both in the USA and 
worldwide.  As a  result of  an  expansionary  monetary  policy  in  the first  years  of  the  21
st 
century, as well as the asymmetry of global supply and demand of savings, interest rates in 
the US financial market were falling from December 2000 to May 2004
9. Since then, interest 
rates in the financial markets both in the USA and worldwide began to rise, climbing up to 
their highest level before the crisis (in the USA from January to May 2007), and in the global 
economy in March 2007 [Gorynia, Kowalski 2008, p. 221 et seq.]. Starting at these turning 
points, the market rates, under the influence of a mass intervention of central banks, began to 
drop again, reaching virtually a zero nominal level at the peak of the intervention.  
Such evolution of money supply and interest rates was accompanied in 2002-2006 by 
a growing budget deficit in the USA and a structural current account deficit. In 2000-2008 the 
American current account deficit ranged from 3.9 to 6.0% of the US GDP.  
  Overliquidity in the financial sector, low real interest rates, and rapid development in 
financial securitization and innovation, significantly contributed to a systematic growth of 
demand for residential and nonresidential real estate, and consequently – to the increase their 
prices
10. Since the beginning of 2003, the stock market also experienced an intensified influx   7 
of capital. The stock market however, suddenly collapsed in the fall of 2007. Similar trends 
could  be seen  in the global  commodity  markets. The general index of commodity prices 
reached its peak in May-July 2008, more than doubling its 2005 level
11. After the collapse of 
raw material prices in late 2008 and early 2009, the index started to rise again. 
The  years  preceding  the  2008-2009  recession,  despite  the  presented  symptoms  of 
current and structural imbalances, especially in the USA, made economic history as the period 
of prosperity and stability. Economic literature refers to it as the Great Moderation
12. This 
period  significantly  influenced  the  consumption  and  saving  pattern  of  households  and 
investment behavior of businesses in both the real and financial sectors. It also shaped the 
design and implementation of economic policy.  
 
2. Theory and practice of economic policy  
 
The post-war reconstruction of European economies and the growth of the American 
economy until the early 1970s, (see Section 1), followed the then Keynesian consensus
13. In 
the field of positive economics, it was a period of undisputed domination of the adaptive 
expectations hypothesis [Kowalski 1998], and the development of investment, consumption 
and economic growth theories.  
The  sphere  of  normative  economics  was  also  dominated  by  various  streams  of 
Keynesian  economics,  including  welfare  economics.  They  created  foundations  for  
recommendations  regarding  the  standard  economic  stabilization  policy.  Theoretical 
foundations  for  quantitative  and  qualitative  economic  policy  were  developed  by  Jan 
Tinbergen [Tinbergen 1955, 1956]. His general systemic approach emphasizing the targets-
instruments relations was subsequently extended both in terms of the econometric apparatus
14, 
as well as the context of the open economy
15.  
Under the prevailing consensus of that time, economic stabilization policy was based 
on active, discretional steps undertaken by governments (by means of fiscal policy and direct 
control instruments), and by central banks (by means  of monetary and exchange rate policy 
instruments) in order to counteract or mitigate the fluctuation of business activity. It was 
generally accepted that the task of such policy was to maintain the economy as close as 
possible  to  the  state  of  “full  employment”  with  low  or  zero  inflation  rate,  and  without 
deteriorating  the  balance  of  payments  [Kowalski  2001,  p.  8].  The  task  of  designing  and 
implementing such a stabilization policy, despite its complexity, due to the multiplicity of   8 
potential  targets  of  economic  policy  and  time  lags,  was  successfully  implemented  in  the 
economic conditions of the 1950s and 1960s (see Table 1 and 2).  
In view of relatively minor international capital flows and the fixed exchange rates 
system (see Section 1), the instruments of fiscal policy played a leading role in the active and 
discretional stabilization policies. In that period, virtually only the Federal Reserve (Fed) and 
the central bank of the Federal Republic of Germany enjoyed a formal and actual political 
independence, but due to the fixed exchange rate system, their functional independence was in 
fact limited.  An  important  addition to the  quantitative policy of governments and central 
banks of the time was the wide use of the instruments of direct control, of administrative and 
regulatory nature. 
The other distinct period, after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, and the 
US 16-month recession of 1973-1975 (see Table 2), was characterized, until the first half of 
the 1980s, by the polarization of positions within both positive and normative economics
16. 
Since  the  mid  1970s,  following  the  reduced  efficiency  of  the  economic  policy  based  on 
Keynesian recommendations, the theory of macroeconomics clearly turned back to classical 
economics. Positive and normative macroeconomics began to adopt the rational expectations 
hypothesis (REH) as defined by John Muth [Muth, 1960, Kowalski, 1987]. The gradually 
emerging new consensus was thus revolving around the concept of rational expectations and 
an  assumption  about  the  ability  of  an  economic  system  to  return  autonomously  to  its 
equilibrium in response to supply and demand shocks. Consequently, the previous active role 
of the state in the economy, as well as its institutional foundations were reinterpreted. The 
new  vision  of  the  functioning  of  economy  and  the  reduced  role  of  economic  policy  that 
followed was based on the presupposition of an autonomous, self-regulatory capacity of the 
market system.   
The  rational  expectations  hypothesis
17  and  the  equilibrium  paradigm  constituted  
a starting point for the new description of the operation of financial, monetary, commodity, 
and labor markets, and the economy as a whole [Lucas, 1973]
18. The issue of the systemic 
role of expectation formation mechanisms became the centre of attention of the theory and 
practice of economic policy. This approach was further strengthened by the globalization of 
economic  processes,  new  information  technologies,  as  well as  mutually-related  effects  of 
information  supply  growth.  Such  combination  of  factors  enhanced  the  importance  of 
expectations.  This  was  reflected  in  the  increasing  significance  of  transparency  of  the 
processes  of  design  and  implementation  of  macroeconomic  policy  and  also  in  economy   9 
deregulation. The tendency for the deregulation stemmed from the already emphasized belief 
in the power of autonomous market adjustments.  
The dominance of REH, and what followed the key significance of expectations to 
designing and implementing of monetary policy, have also led to deep revaluations in this 
field. It formed an important foundation for institutional enhancement of the independent 
position of central banks, extension of the horizon of monetary policy, and finally popularity 
of the direct inflation targeting. The undisputed success of central banks in fighting inflation 
(at least according to its classical definition) allowed governments to reduce a wide band of 
economic  policy  goals  to  a  total  measure  of  stability  and  growth  –  the  output  gap.  As 
globalization  and  regionalization  progressed,  the  predominance  of  the  liberal  stream  of 
normative economics has gradually led to abandonment of active national sectoral policies. 
These trends have also expressed themselves in European integration
19.  
One  of  the  important  features  of  contemporary  economy  is  the  dominance  of  the 
flexible  exchange  rate  system.  Flexible  exchange  rates,  the  already  mentioned  role  of 
monetary  policy,  and  the  prominent  position  of  central  banks  which  gained  political and 
functional autonomy, and thus became independent entities with clearly defined final goals, 
created a new environment for economic policy. Launching these processes and deepening of 
economic integration
20 gradually reduced the scope of national discretional economic policy 
and increased the significance of autonomous market adjustments.  
 
3. The 2008-2009 recession implications for economic theory and policy 
   
3.1. Pre-crisis consensus in theory and practice of economic policy 
 
In view of the evolution of the theory and practice of economic policy presented in 
Sections  1  and  2,  it  is  possible  to  determine  major  economic  policy  pre-crisis  features.  
Mainstream policy was founded on the assumption that despite their doubtless imperfections, 
financial markets and, to a smaller extent, the commodity and labor markets display both 
static (allocative) efficiency, as well as  Schumpeterian efficiency.  In such conditions, the 
basic task of economic policy authorities was to eliminate impediments to efficient operation 
of  markets,  and  thus  supporting  the  autonomous  market  processes,  primarily  through 
deregulation.  Deregulation  and  in  consequence  gradual  reduction  of  the  modern  state's 
functions  to  a  set  of  basic  responsibilities  might  be  interpreted,  on  the  one  hand,  as  
a  deliberate  broadening  of  the  operating  scope  of  the  private  sector  –  by  allowing  more   10 
flexible adjustments to changing market conditions, and on the other hand, as a natural and 
logical reaction to the previously activated globalization processes. Thus, the instruments of 
direct  control  (see  Section  1)  have  been  recently  used  for  implementing  the  concept  of 
deregulation. 
  Fiscal policy was either restricted to formal rules
21, or was shifted to the background. 
This second feature stems from the fact that in open economy conditions, the fiscal multiplier 
is reduced, and moreover, in currently dominating flexible exchange rates active fiscal policy 
is not efficient. An additional factor limiting a potential scope of fiscal expansion might be the 
way it is financed. Typically, budget deficits are partly financed abroad; if fiscal expansion 
gets an unfavorable foreign assessment it might become unfeasible or could require special 
risk premiums on treasuries.  
  After the EMU formation, the exchange rate policy within this grouping ceased to 
have any importance. In relations with third countries, EMU decided to apply the flexible 
exchange rate system. The USA has been using the flexible exchange rate system practically 
since 1971
22. Such a combination of the main parameters of fiscal policy and exchange rate 
policy pushes monetary policy into the foreground. In fact, since the late 1980s, central banks, 
their instruments and the problem of choosing the goals have become the centre of attention 
of both theorists and practicians of economic policy.  
As emphasized in Section 2, central banks gradually began to play a prominent role in 
the  institutional  structure  of  the  design  and  implementation  of  economic  policy.  Their 
position, independent of current political pressure, has been practically universally codified 
and socially and politically accepted. It was commonly acknowledged that their primary goal 
is to ensure low and stable inflation. Due to the huge scale of capital flows and the flexible 
exchange rate system, interest rates, particularly the open market operation rate, became the 
key  instruments  of  central  banks.  Therefore,  due  to  the  long  and  variable  outside  lag  of 
monetary  policy  and expectations as  the  key  channel  of  transmission of  monetary  policy 
impulses, also in this area meant the acceptance of a certain kind of rule. It may be expressed 
by Taylor's rule binding the central bank rate with expected inflation and output gap [Taylor 
1993 and 1999].  
In view of the above findings, it might be asserted that the pre-crisis consensus about 
the optimum economic policy mix ensuring welfare (as its final goal) was based on: 
-  the  postulate  for  deregulation  –  freeing  market  mechanisms  in  a  maximum  breadth  of 
sectors,   11 
-  central  banks’  providing  low  and  stable  inflation,  which  was  seen  as  a  foundation  for 
financial markets’ generation of a relatively low real interest rate, 
- reduction of the output gap (Okun’s gap), with the assumption that the fulfillment of the first 
two  conditions  considerably  increases  the  probability  of  the  reduction,  or  even  complete 
elimination of this gap.  
   
3.2. New outlook on economic policy 
 
With reference to the description of the American economy, as well as the global 
situation in the period directly preceding the events of 2007, 2008, and 2009, it is not difficult  
to see that the rates of the commonly measured inflation were relatively low, real market 
interest rates were also quite low, and the output gap gave no basis for concern. Thus, the 
greatest recession in the USA and Europe since the 1930s occurred despite the fact that the 
pre-crisis  combination  of  parameters  of  macroeconomic  policy  and  macroeconomic 
performance measures were close to an optimum
23. On this basis, a number of conclusions 
may be drawn.  
First of all, the assumption about efficient operation of deregulated markets proved 
unjustified. Particularly, financial markets displayed unexpectedly deep inconsistencies which 
eventually threatened the entire financial system and required the involvement of extensive 
public funds (financed from debt) and intervention of central banks (including unconventional 
quantitative easing) on an extraordinary scale. In this field, deregulation without applying 
necessary rules of caution and efficient supervisory institutions became one of the causes of 
the crisis. The financial system was the main channel for spreading negative impulses and 
uncertainties over the entire global economy. 
Central  banks, though politically and  functionally independent, have failed. It was 
especially evident in the case of the Fed which allowed excessive loosening of monetary 
policy after 2001. Such policy contributed to the emergence of high overliquidity not only in 
the USA but in the whole world economy. China's entrance to the world supply chain of 
goods  distorted  the  standard  image  of  inflation,  making  it  harder  to  diagnose  the  actual 
inflation situation, as well as to prepare reaction scenarios. Despite signals from theorists, 
central banks did not redefine the way inflation was gauged, and did not include indexes 
measuring the inflation pressure in financial assets in the set of actual warning signals.  
Thus both the theoretical foundations of the economic policy, and the pragmatic rules 
for decision-making in central banks, main regulators of financial markets and supervisory   12 
and rating institutions proved inappropriate to the actual complexity and interrelationships 




The current stage of globalization calls for a new outlook on the institutional solutions 
with respect to the design and implementation of economic policy. Surely, the foreground is 
now occupied by the need to revise current solutions regarding information flows and public 
regulation and supervision of economic operations. Thus, the pre-crisis standard approach to  
qualitative economic policy requires revision.  
The efficiency of counteracting such broad economic disruptions we had to and still 
have to face, will improve if we develop new early warning signals about growing inflation 
pressure  and  in  particular  accumulation  of  imbalances.  Especially  the  latter,  due  to  the 
development of financial engineering, are not necessarily quick to be reflected in the prices of 
financial assets. An important condition for the improvement in the efficiency of this policy is  
further  institutionalization  of  the  coordination  of  preventive  actions  of  central  banks  and 
financial supervisory institutions. 
The scale of fiscal interventions rescuing the threatened financial and non-financial 
institutions has led first to the increase in budget deficits, and then to the rise of the public 
debt. This way, fiscal policy returned as a subject of special interest of both theorists and 
policymakers. Basically, the conditions for fiscal policy implementation and its prospective 
efficiency will not change significantly. However, the scale of deficits and the leaping growth 
of public debt will constitute an important factor limiting room for maneuver in economic 
policy. 
It has to be emphasized that individual countries will continue to face shrinking scope 
for selection of instruments of discretionary quantitative economic policy. Therefore, the rank 
of  key  success  factors  and  major  distinguishing  marks  in  the  area  of  their  international 
competitiveness should include qualitative economic policy. It should particularly feature the 
ability  of  governments  and  regulatory  bodies  to  create  and  maintain  a  high  quality  of 
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Endnotes  
                                                
1 In the paper, the author refers to his earlier publications, including [Kowalski 2009] and [Gorynia & 
Kowalski 2009].  
2 In this period, most countries imposed constraints on capital flow. 
3 Quantitative economic policy involves introducing changes to numerical values of fiscal or monetary 
policy instruments in given institutional conditions. Qualitative economic policy denotes designing 
and implementing changes in institutional conditions, such as liberalisation of entry rules, or statutory 
decisions ensuring political and functional independence of central banks. The terms were introduced 
by J. Tinbergen. C. f. [Tinbergen 1955].  
4 As shown in Table 2, in the post-war period in the USA, an average contraction phase lasted 10.8 
months, and average expansion lasted over 60 months. It should be emphasised that the amplitude of 
fluctuations of the post-war cycles was incomparably lower than before 1945. 
5  In  the  1990s,  after  the  phase  of  rapid  growth  in  1960-1980,  Japan  faced  structural  barriers.  In 
consequence, its economy fell into secular stagnation which lasted until the 2000s. The outbreak of the 
Asian crisis in 1997 was an important global event. C. f. [Kowalski 1997] and [Eichengreen 1999].  
6 Among the regional integration groupings, the emergence and development of the European Union 
enjoyed the greatest success. Other major regional trade agreements of this type include NAFTA, 
MERCOSUR, and ASEAN. 
7 It is worth noting that the influence of excessive money supply in the period before the current phase 
of globalisation (characterised by the presence of China in the global circulation of goods and capital) 
would have resulted in economic overheating in the classical sense, and would manifest itself by an 
increase in prices (CPI and PPI). Such a scenario would have been an easy and typical task for central 
banks and fiscal authorities. As China and other quickly-industrialising economies came into world 
play,  their  production  capacity  “smoothed  and  flattened”  the  global  supply  curve  significantly 
modifying the supply and demand conditions in the entire world economy.  
8 It is estimated that as a result of the (primarily Chinese) high demand for American treasuries and 
other financial assets, the financial market interest rates in the USA in 2004-2005 were about two 
percentage points below the level they would have reached without such considerable influx of capital. 
C. f. [World Report, 2005; The Great Thrift Shift, 2005]. 
9 In the global economy the process occurred with a certain time lag in comparison with the USA. 
10 In 2006, the share of the construction industry in the GDP generation reached its highest level in 50 
years. 
11 Data by IMF and Index Mundi. 
12 C. f. e. g. [Fogli and Perri 2006] and [Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro 2010]. 
13 This Section draws on my earlier publications, namely the paper presented at the EMU conference 
[Kowalski 2010], and [Gorynia & Kowalski 2009].  
14 E. g. works of W. Brainard, S. Turnovski, R. Theil, and R. Pindyck.  
15 C. f. T. Swan, R. Mundell. 
16 In the first dimension, it concerned the diagnosis and cause-effect mechanism of the recession and 
stagflation of that time, in the second, it concerned the scale and scope of the autonomous capacity of 
the market economy to return to balance.  
17 In parallel to REH, studies were conducted over the behaviour of business agents, assuming their 
bounded rationality (as defined by A. Simon). C. f. Kowalski [2002]. It implies that the process of 
expectation formation is slower than the REH assumes, and that it may be burdened with errors. This 
direction  of  studies  remained  outside  mainstream  macroeconomics,  but  finally  it  was  used  and 
developed within finance and in behavioural economics. 
18 A breakthrough in the philosophy of modelling changes of economic policy was the publication by 
R.  Lucas,  [Lucas,  1973].  Gradually,  under  the  influence  of  Lucas’s  arguments  and  progress  in 
econometric  modelling  of  macroeconomic  processes  based  on  microeconomic  foundations,  DSGE 
models began to prevail. 
19 See for example the EU competition policy, implementation of the Single European Act, and finally 
the Economic and Monetary Union. 
20 That is, the establishing of the EMU in 1999.   14 
                                                                                                                                                   
21 For example convergence criteria as a necessary condition for joining the Economic and Monetary 
Union,  or  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  as  a  set  of  rules  for  the  EMU  members.  Interestingly,  the 
requirements concerning deficit and level of public debt in relation to GDP formally apply to all EU 
member states.  
22 Among the major economies, only China maintains a system of fixed exchange rates with elements 
of regular correction towards appreciation. 
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